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Abstract
We analyze an emerging sustainable trend in asset management: the decarbonization of institutional portfolios. By using 
broad institutional ownership data, we show that investors exhibit herding behavior in the sense of decarbonization. They 
are inclined to follow their own or other investors’ buys in green stocks and sales in brown stocks over adjacent quarters. 
Beyond that, we find that Hedge Funds as well as Investment Advisors lead the herd by executing trades in the sense of 
decarbonization. This is in line with expectations that sophisticated investors, who integrate environmental aspects into 
their investment decision process, are able to attract imitators. For the aspired achievement of market-wide decarbonization, 
investors leading the herd should be encouraged to further decarbonize their portfolios in order to trigger follow-up trades.
Keywords Decarbonization · Institutional investors · Herding
JEL Classification G11 · G15 · G23 · M14
Introduction
The combat of climate change has evolved as a global chal-
lenge for the entire society. We observe changing awareness 
and behavioral attitudes of society toward environmental-
related issues. Besides, governments already take action or 
prepare to do so in order to mitigate the effects of climate 
change. In addition, the economy is in a state of transfor-
mation toward more environmental-friendly processes and 
activities.
The overarching political global target that represents 
climate change-induced action is the reduction of global 
warming to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. 
However, not only politics and economics are concerned 
with environmental changes and transformations, but also 
the financial market. It has to adapt to changes and take a key 
role in the achievement of sustainable targets. For example, 
the EU Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth of the 
European Commission expects the financial industry to be 
a part of the solution toward a greener economy (European 
Commission 2018).
We analyze one of the emerging sustainable trends in 
asset management: the decarbonization of institutional port-
folios. Our aim is to answer the question whether the decar-
bonization movement is observable in the financial market 
or whether engaging institutions are merely an exceptional 
phenomenon. For this purpose, we address different aspects 
of portfolio decarbonization using the largest institutional 
ownership dataset in literature so far and combine existing 
methodologies for herding measurement.
Since greenhouse gas emissions are one of the main 
causes of global warming, their reduction constitutes the 
main target function for politics and society to combat cli-
mate change and achieve the global 2 °C target. In its tradi-
tional form, decarbonization describes the action to divest 
from carbon-intensive (“brown”) assets and invest in low-
carbon (“green”) assets instead (PDC 2015). In recent times, 
it encompasses far more than greenhouse gas emissions—
the goal should be to align the portfolio with the climate 
economy of the future.
The decarbonization or divestment movement has already 
been initiated back in 2011, as students called for climate 
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action in the management of university endowments.1 Since 
then, commitments to divest have continued to grow rapidly, 
also among institutional investors, such as insurers, pension 
funds, and sovereign wealth funds.
The Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition (PDC) is a driv-
ing force to increase popularity of portfolio decarbonization. 
Its overall aim is to “drive greenhouse gas emissions reduc-
tions by mobilizing a critical mass of institutional inves-
tors committed to gradually decarbonizing their portfolios” 
(PDC 2015). We base our research questions on the target 
setting of the PDC, since it encompasses all aspects of our 
research.
First, we associate the mobilization of a critical mass with 
herding behavior. We follow the definition of Sias (2004) 
who terms herding as institutional investors following each 
other into and out of the same securities over adjacent peri-
ods. Our first research question thus examines whether insti-
tutional investors in general demonstrate herding behavior. 
We show that they in fact do. To be more specific, investors 
tend to follow the trades of other investors rather than fol-
lowing their own. For this purpose, we use the most compre-
hensive ownership dataset so far applied in literature.
Second, we analyze whether herding behavior is also 
present in the context of decarbonization by developing a 
unique approach to unveil such a pattern. We define decar-
bonization herding as investors following their own or oth-
ers’ buy trades in green stocks and their own or others’ sell 
trades in brown stocks, respectively. On the contrary, car-
bonization herding is defined as investors following their 
own or others’ buy trades in brown stocks and sell trades in 
green stocks. Our results show that decarbonization herding 
exists and is of higher importance than carbonization herd-
ing (in the sense of a significant positive difference between 
decarbonization and carbonization herding).
Third, we examine which institutional investor groups 
follow or even promote this herding behavior. We expect 
that professionally managed funds, such as mutual funds 
and hedge funds, are promoting the overall decarbonization 
herding, since they are often bound to reputational con-
cerns (Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Dasgupta et al. 2011). 
In addition, other investor groups might follow their lead, 
since they rely on the supposedly well-informed investment 
decisions of these professional portfolio managers. Besides, 
pension funds and insurance companies are bound to social 
norms (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009; Bolton and Kacperczyk 
2019) and thus should follow the decarbonization trend. In 
fact, we find that Hedge Funds and Investments Advisors, 
which include Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, and Insurance 
Companies, make up the largest part of herding and engage 
highly in decarbonization herding.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. 
“Background and related literature” section describes the 
theoretical foundation and summarizes the related literature. 
In “Sample construction and summary statistics” section, 
we explain the data. “Herding in the financial market” sec-
tion presents the methodology used for the determination 
of overall herding in the financial market and the respec-
tive results, whereas “(De)carbonization herding” section 
introduces our measures of (de)carbonization herding and 
shows our results. “Robustness tests” section gives an over-
view of additional robustness tests, and “Conclusion” sec-
tion concludes.
Background and related literature
Decarbonization describes the process of aligning one’s 
portfolio with the low-carbon climate economy of the future. 
Recent research emphasizes the importance of climate risks 
for institutional investors. For example, Krueger et al. (forth-
coming) conduct a survey with institutional investors and 
find that investors expect significant financial implications 
for firms due to climate risks. Some investors therefore try 
to reduce carbon footprints or stranded asset risks of their 
portfolios. In order to implement such decarbonization 
strategies, investors have to assess a firm’s environmental 
performance. However, detailed information on a firm’s 
carbon emissions, environmental strategy, and impact is 
rather scarce, since there does not exist a common disclo-
sure standard on firm level yet. Investors thus have to take 
readily available information and base their decisions on 
their expectations on how the regulatory environment will 
change and how risk and return patterns will react to these 
changes. In this context, herding of institutional investors 
might arise to a number of intuitive reasons.
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) distinguish between 
intentional and spurious herding. They argue that “true” 
herding results from investors’ obvious intent to copy the 
behavior of others neglecting their own available informa-
tion. On the contrary, when investors take the same decisions 
without considering the actions of others due to the same 
decision problem and information set, the authors speak of 
spurious (unintentional) herding. In the context of decar-
bonization, it is plausible that investors follow the decisions 
of others intentionally, since they are aware that they face 
asymmetric information with respect to evaluating a firm’s 
environmental performance and strategy. The scarcity of 
information might induce them to trust in decisions of oth-
ers and follow them intentionally. However, as all inves-
tors probably have the same scarce information about firms 
and the regulatory environment at hand, investors’ portfolio 
1 The most popular examples include Stanford University, Harvard 
University, Glasgow University, and Yale University, even though not 
all petitions were successful (see, e.g., Litterman 2015).
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decisions can be the result of a common information set 
leading to unintentional herding behavior. Whether investors 
decarbonize their portfolios intentionally or unintentionally 
is difficult to analyze, since the real motive behind an inves-
tor’s trade remains unknown. However, literature provides 
various explanations on why herding should occur—either 
intentionally or unintentionally.2 These explanations provide 
the theoretical foundation of our empirical analysis on decar-
bonization herding.
One of the simplest motives for herding is that inves-
tors follow trends. In recent times, we observe an increased 
awareness for sustainability in society as well as the call 
for financing more sustainable projects and stocks (e.g., 
the Fridays for future movement and the EU Action Plan 
on Financing Sustainable Growth). In turn, green stocks 
become more popular and brown stocks lose their standing 
inducing institutional investors to buy the former and sell 
the latter, i.e., to engage in decarbonization strategies. We 
expect this movement from a critical mass of investors, and 
hence, decarbonization herding should be observable in the 
financial market. Furthermore, due to its current relevance, 
we expect decarbonization herding to be more important 
than carbonization herding.
Besides, investors are dependent on retail flows. Since 
society strives for more sustainable and greener investments 
due to its increased sustainable awareness, retail flows into 
sustainable financial products automatically increase forcing 
investors to invest them in green products and divest from 
brown products. Again, investors might unintentionally show 
decarbonization herding behavior driven by retail flows.
Moreover, we observe informational cascades, i.e., inves-
tors do not make use of their own noisy signals, but infer 
information from previous investors’ trades. Besides demand 
also the offer of sustainable products increases inducing 
institutional investors to intentionally follow the actions of 
others and promote decarbonization herding.
This might also be attractive to investors due to reputa-
tional issues: If investors face a reputational loss when acting 
differently from the herd, they are more inclined to follow 
others’ trades. Increasing popularity of sustainability ratings 
for investment products and demand for disclosure of sus-
tainability criteria in investment vehicles render this herd-
ing motive more than plausible. We expect especially norm 
constrained professionally managed funds such as pension 
funds and well-informed portfolio managers such as mutual 
funds and hedge funds to be driven by reputational motives 
to follow others’ investment decisions and decarbonize their 
portfolios.
Furthermore, investors are often attracted to stocks with 
certain characteristics (characteristic herding). If investors 
choose to invest green, they have a limited investment uni-
verse at hand, thus increasing the probability of uninten-
tional herding for decarbonization.
Finally, investigative herding suggests that investors fol-
low correlated signals at different times, which might reflect 
the process of incorporating information into prices. Climate 
change and respective policy action might involve risks for 
firm values (e.g., Dietz et al. 2016; Campiglio et al. 2018; 
Hong et al. 2019). These new risk sources have to be incor-
porated into market prices leading to spurious decarboniza-
tion herding, i.e., buy decisions for green stocks and sale 
decisions for brown stocks, respectively.
Recent political developments and a tightening regula-
tory environment, such as a binding implementation of the 
EU Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth, might 
intensify herding behavior in the sense of decarbonization of 
institutional investors. The EU Action Plan asks for a reori-
entation of capital flows toward a more sustainable economy, 
inclusion of environmental considerations of investors and 
asset managers into financial decision-making, and standards 
and labels for sustainable financial products, among others 
(European Commission 2018). Worldwide, governments 
ratify the Paris Agreement and commit to actively combat 
climate change.3 Facing these political developments, the 
motives for decarbonization herding seem more relevant 
than ever before.
So far, literature does not show any analyses based on the 
theoretical foundation of decarbonization herding described 
above. This paper closes this research gap and analyses the 
intersection between herding, institutional ownership, and 
decarbonization. We briefly summarize the findings of these 
different strands of literature below.
Lakonishok et al. (1992) develop a simultaneous herding 
measure on stock level. Their results point to the assumption 
that money managers do not herd at a large and meaningful 
way, but rather follow a variety of trading strategies. Grinb-
latt et al. (1995) and Wermers (1999) study herding behavior 
of mutual funds. In their baseline tests, they use the herd-
ing measure of Lakonishok et al. (1992); however, they do 
not find high levels of herding in mutual funds. Sias (2004) 
measures herding as the cross-sectional correlation between 
institutional demand of subsequent quarters instead of test-
ing cross-sectional temporal dependence of trades within a 
period as in Lakonishok et al. (1992). The author finds a pos-
itive correlation between institutional demand over adjacent 
quarters. Furthermore, he shows that herding is attributable 
both to investors following their own last-quarter’s trades 
and others’ last-quarter’s trades. Choi and Sias (2009) and 
2 An overview of herding motives can be found, e.g., in Sias (2004) 
and Choi and Sias (2009). 3 https ://unfcc c.int/proce ss/the-paris -agree ment/statu s-of-ratifi cati on.
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Celiker et al. (2015) use the Lakonishok et al. (1992) and 
the Sias (2004) methodology to answer the question whether 
institutional investors and mutual funds, respectively, follow 
each other into and out of the same industry. Both papers 
find strong evidence for industry herding. Popescu and Xu 
(2018) extend the methodology of Sias (2004) and com-
pute measures for buy-leading and sell-leading of mutual 
funds. Lastly, Jiang and Verardo (2018) develop a herding 
measure on fund level that controls for investment styles 
and institutional preferences. We confirm results of previous 
studies and show that for our sample, herding is observable 
following the methodology of Sias (2004) and Popescu and 
Xu (2018).
The literature covering sustainability takes on various fac-
ets. The literature on divestment, however, is still scarce. In 
their survey of institutional investors, Krueger et al. (forth-
coming) find out that institutional investors use a variety 
of approaches for climate risk management. In particular, 
investors analyze firms’ carbon footprints and stranded 
asset risks, whereas some actively attempt to reduce these 
measures for their portfolio. Divesting problematic portfo-
lio firms is also a practiced management technique. Trinks 
et al. (2017) analyze the financial costs of divestment for 
investor portfolios and find that divested portfolios do not 
underperform the unconstrained market portfolio. Davies 
and Van Wesep (2018) show in a quantification exercise 
of their economic model which consequences divestment 
campaigns have for investors and firms’ managers. Boer-
mans and Galema (2019) demonstrate that Dutch pension 
funds actively decarbonize their portfolios. They focus their 
analysis on pension funds, since these funds face divestment 
pressure from stakeholders.
Lastly, we present literature on the intersection of institu-
tional ownership and sustainability considerations. Graves 
and Waddock (1994) find that institutional investors respond 
favorably to improvements in corporate social responsibil-
ity, i.e., institutional ownership measured by the number of 
institutions owning shares increases when corporate social 
performance improves. Likewise, Chava (2014) shows that 
fewer institutional investors hold shares of firms with envi-
ronmental weaknesses. In addition, the author demonstrates 
that holdings from norm constrained institutions such as pen-
sion funds are significantly lower in firms with higher envi-
ronmental concerns in latter time periods. This speaks for an 
increased environmental awareness of institutional investors. 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) focus on so-called “sin stocks” 
and show that sin stocks have a significantly lower owner-
ship ratio. In turn, Bolton and Kacperczyk (2019) find out 
that insurance companies, investment advisors, and pension 
funds own less high-emission firms. Besides, Dyck et al. 
(2019) analyze the impact of institutional investors on the 
environmental and social performance of a firm. They show 
that institutional ownership positively impacts environmen-
tal and social performance.
With this paper, we contribute to the herding literature by 
focusing on the decarbonization of institutional portfolios. 
For this purpose, we combine three research areas—herding, 
institutional investors, and sustainability—to derive impor-
tant insights into the sustainability trend in asset manage-
ment. With our unique approach of measuring (de)carboni-
zation herding, we answer the research question whether 
institutional investors tend to follow their own or others’ 
trades that point to the decarbonization of portfolios. Our 
results confirm that herding in the financial market is driven 
by decarbonization trades. Thus, we demonstrate that insti-
tutional investors indeed tend to follow the decarbonization 
movement in the financial market and are inclined to pursue 
sustainable trends in asset management.
Sample construction and summary statistics
We obtain data from different databases. The ownership 
data is sourced from the Refinitiv Ownership and Profiles 
database.4 This is the most complete global shares database 
providing insight into the ownership structure of over 70,000 
publicly traded equities in over 70 markets. The data are 
sourced from stock exchanges, regulatory bodies, institu-
tions, and different financial reports, e.g., 13F filings. It 
covers different types of investors, e.g., Investment Advi-
sors, Governmental Agencies, Foundations, and Individual 
Investors from all over the world. The database reports for 
each quarter the shares held and the respective market value 
of the investors’ positions at the respective firms as well as 
the percentage held.
We run several filters to fit the ownership data to our 
needs. In order to prove herding behavior for investors, we 
need information on the trading activity of individual inves-
tors. We define an investor’s trading activity as purchasing 
a stock if the percentage held increased over the quarter. In 
the opposite case, the investor’s activity is identified as sell-
ing the stock. However, the ownership data obtained from 
Refinitiv contain the ownership structure of stocks and not 
trading data, which means that we obtain information on 
which shareholders hold the particular stock in their port-
folio and to what extent. To fully determine the investor’s 
trading activity, we complement our dataset to control for 
interim and final sales. We exclude all investors if they do 
not trade at least one stock over the observation period, and 
we exclude investors with less than eight quarters of owner-
ship data.
4 Formerly known as Thomson Reuters Ownership data.
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We categorize stocks as brown and green using ESG data 
of the Refinitiv ESG5 database. With information for over 
7000 firms, this database covers the most important stocks 
traded on global stock markets and therefore serves as a 
good proxy for the worldwide investment universe. Refinitiv 
uses over 400 ESG metrics and assesses firms on the basis of 
their sustainable use of resources, emissions, environmental 
production processes, human rights, and management struc-
tures. It is currently perceived as one of the best available 
sources for firms’ environmental, social, and governance 
information. Due to the fact that we want to analyze (de)car-
bonization herding, we focus only on one of the three pillars, 
namely the environmental pillar score (E-score). Hereby, 
firms are ranked according to their resource usage, emis-
sion reduction efforts, and their degree of environmental 
innovation. Every year, we calculate the median E-Score of 
all firms and identify firms with an E-Score greater (smaller) 
than the median as green (brown), which leads to half of 
the stocks being classified as green and brown, respectively, 
each year.
We do not solely focus on carbon emissions to identify 
brown and green stocks for many reasons. First of all, data 
availability on carbon emissions is rather scarce. Further-
more, investors choose different strategies to actually decar-
bonize their portfolios (e.g., exclusionary criteria, carbon 
footprints, and engagement; PDC 2017). This makes it dif-
ficult to measure decarbonization herding based on one spe-
cific stock criterion. Besides, due to recent developments, 
financial market participants demand forward-looking 
assessments for sustainability. PDC (2017) emphasizes that 
investors have to systematically determine and consider 
climate-related risks and opportunities. Hence, “portfolio 
decarbonization refers to systematic efforts by investors to 
align their investment portfolios with the goals of a low-
carbon economy” (PDC 2017). This subsumes not only the 
reduction of the carbon footprint, but also, e.g., an increased 
investment in renewable energies and capital withdrawal 
from high energy consumption activities (PDC 2017). For 
this reason, we choose to label firms as brown or green based 
on the environmental pillar score, since it comprises a more 
forward-looking assessment of sustainability and a wider 
scope than just carbon emissions.6
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. 
From January 2002 to September 2017, we observe 5669 
distinct firms, for which we were able to obtain owner-
ship data on a quarterly basis and for which ESG data are 
available. The number of firms in this study increases each 
year until it reaches its peak in 2016 with 5064 stocks. Each 
quarter, we identify an investor as a buyer if her owner-
ship in the respective stock increases compared to the last 
quarter and as a seller if it decreases. The number of identi-
fied trades increases nearly sevenfold from 2002 to 2016.7 
The most trades can be observed in 2016 with around 4.5 
million trades. Over our sample period, we identify slightly 
more buys than sales with an average buy to overall trades 
ratio of around 53%, which is in line with existing literature 
(Wermers 1999; Choi and Sias 2009).
Due to the fact that we distinguish between green and 
brown stocks, we also consider the respective buy and sell 
ratios of these two stock groups. The buy and sell ratio of 
brown stocks are on average higher than the buy and sell 
ratio of green stocks. The decarbonization ratio (sum of the 
buy ratio of green stocks and the sell ratio of brown stocks) 
and the carbonization ratio (sum of the buy ratio of brown 
stocks and the sell ratio of green stocks) do not exhibit large 
differences with the decarbonization ratio being slightly 
higher on average.
Table 2 contains statistics about the investor types. For 
the 5669 firms, we obtain ownership information for over 
137,976 investors and we classify each of them into one 
of eight investor types.8 To the best of our knowledge, the 
ownership dataset in this study is, so far, the largest one used 
to study herding behavior. Just like the number of stocks, 
the number of investors increases over the sample period 
with a maximum of 77,640 unique investors in 2016 as 
shown in Panel A. The number of observed investors differs 
greatly between the different investor types. Only around 30 
investors are identified as Foundations, while up to 60,000 
(78%) of the observed investors are identified as Individual 
Investors. But, more interesting than the absolute number of 
investors is the number of trades that these groups execute 
(Panel B). Although Individual Investors make up the largest 
share of the observed investors, they do not trade as much 
as the group of Hedge Funds and Investment Advisors. The 
most trades are executed by Investment Advisors with nearly 
2.5 million trades in 2016.
5 Previously known as Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG.
6 According to Refinitiv, the environmental score “reflects how well 
a company uses best management practices to avoid environmen-
tal risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities” (Thomson 
Reuters 2015). The score thus is appropriate for our needs to identify 
stocks for portfolio decarbonization.
7 The number of trades in 2017 decreases due to the fact that we 
obtain ownership data only until September 2017. We are therefore 
missing one quarter in 2017.
8 The original investor types reported by Refinitiv are more granular, 
but we group similar investor types together for the sake of clarity. 
Endowment Funds are included in Foundations, Research Firms are 
included in Banks and Trusts, Private Equity includes Holding Com-
panies and Venture Capital Firms, and Investment Advisors include 
Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, and Insurance Companies.
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Herding in the financial market
At first, we analyze in how far the financial market exhibits 
herding behavior. For this purpose, we combine the meth-
odologies of Sias (2004) and Popescu and Xu (2018). In this 
way, we do not only connect different measurement methods 
to derive more detailed insights into herding behavior, but 
Herding can derive from different sources. Therefore, 
Sias (2004) decomposes the beta coefficient into two sources 
of herding: investors following their own trades, i.e., they 
trade the same stock in the same direction in the following 
period, and other investors following the trade of the inves-
tor, i.e., in the following period, another investor trades the 
same stock in the same direction.
where Ni,t is the number of investors trading stock i in quar-
ter t and Dn,i,t is a dummy variable that equals one (zero) if 
investor n buys (sells) the stock i in quarter t. Likewise, Ni,t+1 
is the number of investors trading stock i in quarter t + 1, 
Dn,i,t+1 is a dummy variable that equals one (zero) if inves-
tor n buys (sells) the stock i in quarter t +1, and Dm,i,t+1 is a 
dummy variable that equals one (zero) if investor m(m ≠ n) 
buys (sells) the stock i in quarter t + 1. It is the overall num-
ber of stocks which are traded in quarter t. The first part of 
Eq. (5) represents the part of the correlation that results from 
investors following their own trades in consecutive quarters, 
i.e., buying (selling) a share in t and buying (selling) it again 
in t + 1. We expect this term to be positive if investor trading 
is persistent over time, i.e., investors trade the same stock in 
the same direction a quarter later. If investors tend to avoid 
executing the same trades as before, the term becomes nega-
tive. If there is no systematic correlation between the trading 
activities of investors in two consecutive quarters, the sum 
for this quarter becomes zero. The second part of the cross-
sectional correlation in Eq. (5) results from other investors 
following the trades of the respective investor. The same 
expectations regarding the direction of the correlation apply 
here. This method therefore helps to answer the question 
whether investors follow themselves or others when trading 
the same stocks in the following quarter.
Table 3 Panel A reports the average herding coefficients 
over 62 cross-sectional regressions and the associated t-sta-
tistics. The average cross-sectional correlation of the lagged 
and the current institutional demand is significantly posi-
tive with a value of 0.3203 which is in line with existing 
literature, such as Sias (2004), Choi and Sias (2009), and 
Celiker et al. (2015). This illustrates clearly that on average 
the financial market shows herding behavior.
In a next step, we decompose the herding measure into 
different sources of herding. One arises from investors fol-



























































also do so by using the largest institutional ownership dataset 
so far in the literature.
For each stock in each quarter, we calculate the buy ratio, 
defined as the number of all purchases in that stock divided 
by all trades in that specific stock.
As seen in Table 1, the average buy ratio over all stocks 
over the whole sample period is approximately 53%.
Following Sias (2004), we further calculate the standard-
ized buy ratio of stock i as
where brt is the cross-sectional average of the buy ratio in 




 is the cross-sectional 
standard deviation in quarter t over all stocks i.
As in Sias (2004), we define herding as investors follow-
ing themselves or each other into or out of the same stock 
over consecutive quarters. In order to prove herding behav-
ior, the cross-sectional correlation of the institutional inves-
tors’ demand for a share between two consecutive quarters 
is calculated. This cross-sectional correlation is equivalent 
to the coefficient from the regression of the standardized 
institutional demand for share i in quarter t + 1 on the stand-
ardized institutional demand for share i in quarter t.
Due to the standardized factors, the constant is zero and 
the coefficient t simplifies to
(1)bri,t =
#of buysi,t
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other from other investors following the trades of the respec-
tive investor, which we refer to as following-herding. Both 
components make a significant contribution to the average 
herding measure. Around 5% of average herding results 
from self-herding, which is in line with the hypothesis that 
institutional investors split bigger investments into several 
trades over some period to minimize their price impact 
(Chakravarty 2001). However, as seen in Panel A, most of 
the herding, nearly 95%, derives from following-herding. 
Choi and Sias (2009) have already shown this pattern when 
taking aggregated stock industries into account rather than 
individual stocks. A slightly increased herding measure and 
the same pattern also occur when only stocks traded by more 
than 50 or 100 investors are considered.
Some investors are limited in their actions due to short-
selling or liquidity constraints (Wylie 2005). Thus, the herd-
ing resulting from a stock sale might be limited in compari-
son to herding resulting from a buy of the same stock. In the 
spirit of Popescu and Xu (2018), we further extend the Sias 
(2004) model and decompose Eq. (5) to compute the portion 
of self-herding or following-herding triggered by investors’ 
buys or sales. In this way, we eliminate the possibility of 
confounding effects between buy and sale trades.
Table 3  Herding in the financial market
This table shows tests for herding measures for securities with equal or more than 1, 50, and 100 traders, respectively, for the sample period. 
Panel A calculates the overall average herding measure as well as the self- and following-herding using the methodology described in Sias 
(2004). Panel B additionally decomposes herding in buy and sell herding in the sense of Popescu and Xu (2018). The columns labeled as “%” 
indicates the share of the respective herding source on the average herding measure. Statistical significance is measured by two-sided t tests and 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. T-statistics are shown in parentheses
Panel A: Tests for overall herding
Average herding ( ) Self-herding % Following-herding %
Securities with ≥ 1 traders 0.3203 0.0161 5.03% 0.3042 94.97%
(34.16***) (8.21***) (34.09***)
Securities with ≥ 50 traders 0.3228 0.0153 4.74% 0.3074 95.26%
(34.28***) (8.14***) (34.43***)
Securities with ≥ 100 traders 0.3237 0.0132 4.09% 0.3104 95.91%
(33.10***) (7.98***) (32.80***)













Securities with ≥ 1 traders 0.3203 0.0032 1.00% 0.0129 4.03% 0.1420 44.32% 0.1623 50.66%
(34.16***) (1.97*) (8.52***) (30.17***) (31.44***)
Securities with ≥ 50 traders 0.3228 0.0029 0.89% 0.0124 3.86% 0.1435 44.46% 0.1639 50.80%
(34.28***) (1.87*) (9.11***) (30.43***) (31.98***)
Securities with ≥ 100 traders 0.3237 0.0018 0.56% 0.0114 3.53% 0.1454 44.91% 0.1651 50.99%
(33.10***) (1.24) (9.00***) (29.25***) (30.87***)
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Equation  (6) is a more detailed version of Eq.  (5), 
whereby a distinction is made between herding result-





 , i.e., 1 for purchase and 0 for sale for the trade 
of investor n (m) of stock i in quarter t. This decomposition 
enables us to show whether investors mainly exhibit self- or 
following-herding when the triggering trade is a buy or a 
sale.
In Panel B of Table 3, the sum of self-herding resulting 
from buys (0.0032) and sales (0.0129) has to be equal to 
the general self-herding measure (0.0161) from Panel A, 
whereas the same applies to following-herding. Furthermore, 
the sum of all four components corresponds to the general 
average herding coefficient of 0.3203. The results show that 
herding is triggered by both buys and sales. In unreported 
analyses, we show that the differences between the buy and 
sell herding for self-herding as well as for following-herding 
are statistically significant. More important, all four herding 
sources have a significant share on the overall herding meas-
ure. The largest portion of herding is triggered by the sale 
of a stock (54.69%), whereby for the most part (50.66%), 
this sale functioned as a signal for other investors to sell this 
stock as well in the following quarter. The results are con-
sistent with existing studies and are robust when considering 
only stocks that are traded by more than 50 or 100 investors.
(De)carbonization herding
In the last section, we have shown that the financial market 
approximated by our large dataset exhibits herding behav-
















































































































9 For a more detailed derivation, see the “Appendix”.
further to break down the herding measure in (de)carboniza-
tion herding.
Henceforth, we distinguish between self-herding and 
following-herding induced by purchases or sales of green 
and brown stocks, i.e., we differentiate whether the trigger-
ing buy or sale in quarter t takes place in a green or a brown 
stock. For this purpose, we extend Eq. (6) once again.9 To 
answer our main research question, we differentiate between 
herding in the sense of decarbonization and carbonization.
We define decarbonization herding as the behavior of 
investors to buy a green stock which was recently bought by 
the investor herself or some other investor, as well as to sell 
a brown stock which was recently sold by the investor herself 
or some other investor. Thus, we capture whether triggering 
trades in the spirit of decarbonization cause the same inves-
tor or other investors to decarbonize their portfolios as well 
in the subsequent quarter and thus induce herding behavior.
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where It,green and It,brown indicate the number of stocks identi-
fied as green or brown.
The decarbonization following-herding equals the sum 
of the following-herding resulting from the buy of a green 
stock and the following-herding resulting from the sale of 
a brown stock. In contrast, herding in the sense of carboni-
zation would be the exact opposite, i.e., the portion of the 
herding measure resulting from the same investor or other 
investors increasing their shares in a brown stock by fol-
lowing the respective investor’s buy of a brown stock and 
decreasing their shares in a green stock following the sale 
of the green stock.
where It,green and It,brown indicate the number of stocks identi-
fied as green or brown.
As shown before, we observe significant herding behavior 
in the financial market. If there was no preference for either 
green or brown stocks when following own trades or trades 
of other investors, the four carbonization and decarboniza-
tion herding measures introduced above should have approx-
imately the same value. We show that this is not the case.
Table  4 shows the average of the different herding 
sources. The sum of the four (de)carbonization herding 
measures equals the overall herding measure of the finan-
cial market (0.3203). As we can see, there is a significant 









































































































































































process compared to carbonization herding. The majority 
of the herding, over 96%, results from the decarbonization 
behavior of investors. The biggest share of this herding 
measure (0.3002) results from following-herding. It seems 
that investors are more likely to buy green shares which were 
bought by other investors and to sell brown shares which 
were sold by other investors in the preceding quarter. We 
can therefore confirm our hypothesis that for the global act-
ing investors observed in this study, there exists herding in 
terms of the aspired decarbonization process.10 In contrast, 
decarbonization self-herding (0.0087) as well as the carboni-
zation following-herding (0.0040) do not have a significant 
influence on the overall herding measure over the observed 
62 quarters.
To get a better understanding about herding in our sam-
ple, Fig. 1 plots the decarbonization and carbonization herd-
ing measures for self- and following-herding. As already 
seen in Table 4, self-herding for decarbonization as well as 
carbonization is rather small and on average close to zero 
over time. In contrast, following-herding is much more 
10 In unreported analysis, we show that, as expected, the overall 
herding measure is driven by the largest investors in terms of assets 
under management. Nevertheless, we find for every investor size that 
trades in the sense of decarbonization trigger more follow-up trades 
than trades in the sense of carbonization. Results are available upon 
request from the authors.
volatile and reveals some interesting interrelations over 
time. Even though the average carbonization following-
herding is close to 0 (0.0040), it is negative most of the 
time from 2006 to 2012. As defined before, carbonization 
herding covers following trades on sales of green stocks and 
purchases of brown stocks. Thus, a negative carbonization 
herding coefficient relates to investors who tend to buy green 
24 L. Benz et al.
stocks that others have previously sold and sell brown stocks 
that other investors have previously bought. Therefore, the 
following investors decarbonize their portfolios. Taking 
this into account, the actual decarbonization effect is even 
greater than initially assumed. Until 2006, the differences 
between decarbonization and carbonization herding are not 
as clear-cut as in the following period. In 2006, the decar-
bonization following-herding leaps from − 13 to + 30%, and 
the decarbonization and carbonization following-herding 
diverge strongly from this moment on. We interpret this as 
a movement of investors who pay more attention to whether 
other investors decarbonize their portfolios and then fol-
low this strategy. Around the years 2010 and 2011, we can 
see the highest decarbonization following-herding with 
over 60% and the most negative carbonization following-
herding around − 26%. From the third to the last quarter 
of 2016, we notice an interesting pattern. Decarbonization 
following-herding drops significantly, whereas carbonization 
following-herding increases over the level of decarboniza-
tion following-herding. In this time period, investors rather 
followed others’ buys in brown stocks and sales in green 
stocks. The events happening in this time period provide a 
valid explanation for this pattern. In November 2016, Don-
ald Trump won the Presidential Election. Trump often stated 
that he does not believe in climate change and finally decided 
to withdraw from the Paris Agreement (Pompeo 2019). In 
December 2016, he nominated Scott Pruitt, an opponent 
to climate change combat, as head of the US Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (Springer Nature 2016). During the 
same time, the 2016 United Nations Climate Change Con-
ference in Marrakesh led to a great disappointment among 
climate change campaigners (Worley 2016). Those events 
Table 4  (De)carbonization 
herding
This table shows the decarbonization and carbonization herding measures as defined in the text for the 
sample period. The column labeled as “%” indicates the share of the (de)carbonization measure on the 
average herding measure in the financial market. Statistical significance is measured by two-sided t tests 
and *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. T-statistics are 
shown in parentheses
Average herding ( ) Average herding 






















Fig. 1  Herding behavior over 
time. This figure plots the (de)
carbonization self- and follow-
ing-herding measures over the 
sample period from January 
2002 to September 2017. The 
herding measures are calculated 
as described in the text
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might have influenced expectations of institutional inves-
tors on future developments of the regulatory environment 
concerning climate change action, who in turn revised their 
decarbonization investment decisions, leading to decreased 
herding following trades in the spirit of decarbonization.
So far, we have proven that there is a general herding 
behavior in the financial market and moreover that investors 
pay attention to whether other investors decarbonize their 
portfolios. With our next analysis, we try to find out which 
investor type leads this decarbonization movement, which 
investor type carries out the buys and sales, which follows 
itself, and which is followed in the consecutive quarter by 
other investors. We therefore calculate the proportion of the 
overall herding attributable to one specific type of investor. 
We then calculate for each investor type the share of decar-
bonization and carbonization herding as we have shown in 
Table 4 for the entire sample of investors. The sum of all 
individual parts across investor types must be the same as 
the overall herding measure from the beginning (0.3203).
For each type, we can confirm that the proportion of 
decarbonization herding is significantly higher than the one 
of carbonization herding. The only exception is Foundations, 
where we only find an insignificant but still positive differ-
ence. The difference is mostly driven by investors following 
other investors rather than themselves. A substantial part of 
overall herding is driven by the trades of Individual Inves-
tors (5.10%) and Banks and Trusts (4.65%). The trades of 
Investment Advisors and Hedge Funds trigger the major part 
of overall herding in the financial market (53.08%/34.43%), 
which is not surprising due to the high number of trades 
executed by these two investor types. 51.98% of overall herd-
ing is driven by triggering trades of Investment Advisors in 
the spirit of decarbonization. This means, if an Investment 
Advisor buys a green stock or sells a brown stock, it is more 
likely that another investor or the Advisor herself will fol-
low her than if the Advisor traded exactly the opposite way 
in the first place.
To further test which investor type demonstrates the most 
decarbonization herding, we redo the analyses above, but 
now we consider the aggregated investor types rather than 
the underlying individual investors. Therefore, we consider 
every investor type as a single investment portfolio and 
aggregate the shares held of each stock across all inves-
tors from one type. By doing this, we consider whether the 
aggregated group of investors buys or sells the respective 
stock as well as account for different numbers of trades of 
the various investor types.
Table 6 Panel A shows a pattern similar to Table 3 Panel 
B, where we can see the overall herding measure as well as 
the differentiation between herding induced by buys or sales. 
Due to the aggregation on investor type level, the overall 
level of herding is lower (0.0636) compared to the previ-
ous herding measure on investor level (0.3203). Besides, 
the proportion of self-herding is much larger than before. 
32.73% of herding results from an investor type selling the 
same stock over consecutive quarters, therefore splitting 
its sales over consecutive quarters. This can be regarded as 
intra-group herding (herding within an investor type). The 
overall following-herding now accounts for only 44.89%, 
whereas on investor level about 94.98% of the overall herd-
ing measure is determined by following-herding. Investor 
type self-herding accounts for 55.11%, thus being more 
important for overall herding than following-herding. This 
leads to the conclusion that a lot of investors trade the same 
stocks the same direction over consecutive quarters as inves-
tors of the same investor type, e.g., Investment Advisors tend 
to follow the trades of other Investment Advisors.
Panel B is similar to Table 5 and shows the breakdown of 
the investor type level herding in terms of decarbonization 
and carbonization. Similar to before, for each type, except 
for Governments, a significant larger proportion of overall 
herding results from decarbonization trades. Hedge Funds 
(36.62%) and Investment Advisors (33.03%) still account 
for the largest part of overall herding; however, the share of 
Investment Advisors is lower than before (33.03 vs. 53.08%). 
In turn, the percentage of the other investor types, especially 
the proportions of Banks and Trusts as well as Individual 
Investors, triggers more follow-up trades compared to the 
investor level measure in Table 5. When only taking self-
herding into account, we find that Individual Investors as 
well as Private Equity firms are more likely to follow trades 
in the sense of carbonization rather than decarbonization. 
For following-herding, we find the same pattern as before, 
with herding in the sense of decarbonization being more 
pronounced.
The results in Tables 5 and 6 are in line with expectations 
on which investor type might be more inclined not only in 
herding behavior but also in portfolio decarbonization. Only 
a small part of decarbonization herding is driven by trades of 
Private Equity firms (0.22% and 3.72%, respectively). This 
is in line with Crifo et al. (2015) who state that sustainable 
firms are not particularly attractive for Private Equity inves-
tors compared to others. Hence, investment decisions are 
possibly not driven by the motive of portfolio decarboniza-
tion. The investment decisions of Governments (0.56% or 
6.15% of decarbonizaton herding) and Corporations (2.20% 
and 4.48%) are often linked to a strongly investor-specific 
purpose, which is only of a limited imitative nature. Govern-
ments hold large shares in basic industries and the transpor-
tation industry (Bortolotti and Faccio 2009) and thus might 
be rather inclined to retain control in certain firms build-
ing stable and long-term ownership. Thus, herding is not a 
relevant strategy for governmental purposes. In the case of 
Corporations, the investor-specific purpose is reflected in the 
intention to enter into strategic alliances according to their 
specific business needs (Allen and Phillips 2000).
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As a main result, Investment Advisors seem to promote 
decarbonization herding besides Hedge Funds. This result 
confirms the hypothesis that Mutual Funds and especially 
Hedge Funds are considered as well-informed portfolio man-
agers inducing other investors to follow their lead (Eichen-
green et al. 1998). The reason for the strong herding move-
ment after their trades could lie in the anticipatory ability 
of these sophisticated investors to recognize capital market 
trends such as decarbonization. The original motivation of 
the leading portfolio managers does not necessarily have 
to be based on noble intentions with the aim of acting in a 
sustainable way, but could also be based on profiting from 
expected price movements of green or brown stocks. In addi-
tion, professional money managers are exceptionally prone 
to reputational herding due to career concerns (Scharfstein 
and Stein 1990; Dasgupta et al. 2011) and certain types 
such as pension funds and insurance companies are bound 
to social norms (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009; Bolton and 
Kacperczyk 2019). All of these motives trigger a large herd-
ing movement for these investor types.
Table 5  (De)carbonization 
herding per investor type
The table shows the average (de)carbonization herding measures per investor type in the sample period. 
The calculation of the herding measures follows the description in the text. Investors are grouped into 
investor types as described in the text. For comparison purposes, the overall average herding measure is 
shown as well. The column labeled as “%” indicates the share of the (de)carbonization herding on the aver-
age herding measure. The rows denoted as “Difference” are the differences between the decarbonization 
and the carbonization measure per investor type. Statistical significance is measured by two-sided t tests 
and *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively
Average herding 
( ) per group
% Self-herding Following-herding Average herding ( )
Bank and trust
Decarbonization 0.0127 3.97 − 0.0003 0.0131
Carbonization 0.0022 0.68 0.0002 0.0019
Difference 0.0106*** − 0.0006*** 0.0111***
Corporation
Decarbonization 0.0071 2.20 0.0002 0.0069
Carbonization − 0.0017 − 0.53 0.0000 − 0.0016
Difference 0.0087*** 0.0003** 0.0085***
Foundation
Decarbonization 0.0002 0.06 0.0000 0.0002
Carbonization 0.0001 0.03 0.0000 0.0001
Difference 0.0001 0.0000*** 0.0001
Government
Decarbonization 0.0018 0.56 − 0.0001 0.0019
Carbonization 0.0007 0.21 − 0.0001 0.0008 0.3203 (34.16***)
Difference 0.0011* 0.0000 0.0011*
Hedge fund
Decarbonization 0.1013 31.63 0.0043 0.0971
Carbonization 0.0090 2.80 0.0037 0.0053
Difference 0.0924*** 0.0006 0.0918***
Individual investor
Decarbonization 0.0186 5.79 0.0016 0.0169
Carbonization − 0.0022 − 0.69 − 0.0002 − 0.0020
Difference 0.0208*** 0.0018** 0.0190***
Investment advisor
Decarbonization 0.1665 51.98 0.0030 0.1635
Carbonization 0.0035 1.10 0.0038 − 0.0003
Difference 0.1630*** − 0.0008 0.1638***
Private equity
Decarbonization 0.0007 0.22 0.0000 0.0007
Carbonization − 0.0001 − 0.02 0.0000 − 0.0001
Difference 0.0008*** 0.0000 0.0008***
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Robustness tests
We conduct several additional analyses to test the robustness 
of our results. First, we divide stocks in green and brown 
based on a static selection process. A stock is labeled as 
green if its average environmental score is above the median 
of all scores in the sample, and brown otherwise. Since we 
do not require stocks to have a complete time series of scores 
Table 6  Investor type herding
This table shows herding measures on investor type level for the sample period. Investors are grouped into investor types as described in the 
text. Panel A calculates the overall herding measure on investor type level as in Sias (2004) and decomposes it in buy and sell herding follow-
ing Popescu and Xu (2018). Panel B shows the (de)carbonization herding measures per investor type. The rows denoted as “Difference” are the 
differences between the decarbonization and carbonization herding measure per investor type. Columns labeled as “%” indicate the share of 
the respective herding measure on the overall average herding measure. Statistical significance is based on two-sided t tests and *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. In Panel A, t-statistics are shown in parentheses
Panel A: Tests for investor type overall herding





0.0636 0.0142 22.38% 0.0208 32.73% 0.0141 22.17% 0.0144 22.72%
(12.01***) (7.45***) (11.15***) (6.68***) (4.56***)
Panel B: (De)carbonization herding of investor types
Average herding ( ) 
per group
% Self-herding Following-herding Average herding ( )
Bank and trust
 Decarbonization 0.0091 14.33% 0.0023 0.0068
 Carbonization − 0.0019 − 3.03% − 0.0021 0.0002
 Difference 0.0110*** 0.0044*** 0.0066**
Corporation
Decarbonization 0.0028 4.48% 0.0002 0.0027
Carbonization − 0.0050 − 7.87% − 0.0002 − 0.0048
Difference 0.0078*** 0.0004 0.0075***
Foundation
Decarbonization 0.0023 3.64% 0.0007 0.0016
Carbonization − 0.0003 − 0.50% 0.0001 − 0.0004
Difference 0.0026*** 0.0006 0.0020***
Government
 Decarbonization 0.0039 6.15% 0.0025 0.0015
 Carbonization 0.0017 2.68% 0.0013 0.0004 0.0636 (12.01***)
 Difference 0.0022 0.0012** 0.0011
Hedge fund
Decarbonization 0.0192 30.22% 0.0086 0.0106
Carbonization 0.0041 6.40% 0.0059 − 0.0018
Difference 0.0151*** 0.0027** 0.0124***
Individual investor
 Decarbonization 0.0064 10.09% 0.0011 0.0053
 Carbonization − 0.0003 − 0.53% 0.0022 − 0.0025
 Difference 0.0068*** − 0.0010** 0.0078***
Investment advisor
 Decarbonization 0.0179 28.09% 0.0083 0.0096
 Carbonization 0.0031 4.94% 0.0045 − 0.0014
 Difference 0.0147*** 0.0038*** 0.0109***
Private equity
 Decarbonization 0.0024 3.72% − 0.0004 0.0027
 Carbonization − 0.0018 − 2.83% 0.0001 − 0.0019
 Difference 0.0042*** − 0.0005*** 0.0046***
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available, we assign the characteristic of greenness (brown-
ness) to each stock from its existence on. Thus, we are able 
to extend our data sample to a time period from 2000 to 
2017. All of our results remain economically the same. How-
ever, this procedure might lead to a look-ahead bias of the 
sustainability characteristic of a stock.
Second, we undertake a reclassification of the stocks. We 
classify the observed stocks not only into green and brown, 
but into three groups, i.e., green, brown, and neutral. Each 
year, we divide the stocks into tertiles according to their 
E-score. We classify the bottom third as brown, the middle 
third as neutral, and the top third as green. Herding result-
ing from trades in neutral stocks accounts for around one-
third of the overall herding measure. Our main finding from 
Table 4, that herding in terms of decarbonization is more 
pronounced than herding in terms of carbonization, remains 
unchanged.11
Third, as shown by Sias (2004), herding behavior of insti-
tutional investors differs when considering different stock 
sizes measured by market capitalization. Depending on the 
herding motive used, the anticipated relation between stock 
size and herding measure differs. Informational cascades 
are more likely for small firms because investors might not 
make use of their own noisy signals, but infer information 
from previous investors’ trades (Wermers 1999). Therefore, 
they overweight the information they gather from others and 
herding should be more pronounced within small stocks. On 
the contrary, if investigative herding is more pronounced 
among investors, i.e., investors trade on correlated signals, 
herding should be more pronounced in larger stocks (Sias 
2004). Some could argue that our results regarding the 
more pronounced decarbonization herding than carboniza-
tion herding could be driven by stocks of a certain market 
capitalization. We follow Sias (2004) and sort the observed 
stocks each quarter into quintiles based on their market capi-
talization. We redo the research done above in Table 4 for 
each of the stock quintiles. Due to the use of standardized 
dependent and independent variables, the measured coef-
ficients are comparable across quintiles.
As shown in Table 7, the average herding is more pro-
nounced within large stocks compared to the herding in 
small stocks (0.26011 vs. 0.1895), which contradicts the 
findings of Sias (2004). Following the reasoning of Sias 
(2004), we conclude that the herding observed in our 
Table 7  (De)carbonization herding per market capitalization quintiles
This table shows the decarbonization and carbonization herding measures as defined in the text for the sample period separately for different 
stock sizes. Each quarter we sort the observed stocks into quintiles based on their market capitalization. The column labeled as “%” indicates the 
share of the (de)carbonization herding on the average herding measure. The rows denoted as “Difference” are the differences between the decar-
bonization and the carbonization measure per investor type. Statistical significance is measured by two-sided t tests and *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively
Market capitalization quintile Average herding ( ) per group % Self-herding Following-herding Average herding ( )
1 (small)
Decarbonization 0.1607 84.82 0.0082 0.1526 0.1895
Carbonization 0.0288 15.18 0.0122 0.0165 (16.69***)
Difference 0.1320*** − 0.0041** 0.1360***
2
Decarbonization 0.0756 62.79 0.0021 0.0734 0.12039
Carbonization 0.0448 37.21 0.0036 0.0412 (8.93***)
Difference 0.0308 − 0.0015 0.0323
3
Decarbonization 0.1133 67.92 0.0005 0.1129 0.16685
Carbonization 0.0535 32.08 0.0040 0.0496 (13.49***)
Difference 0.0598* − 0.0035 0.0633**
4
Decarbonization 0.1218 64.81 0.0027 0.1191 0.18792
(16.12***)Carbonization 0.0661 35.19 0.0016 0.0645
Difference 0.0557* 0.0011 0.0545*
5 (large)
Decarbonization 0.1954 75.12 0.0075 0.1879 0.26011
(21.85***)Carbonization 0.0647 24.88 0.0015 0.0632
Difference 0.1307*** 0.0060 0.1247***
11 Results are not reported but available upon request from the 
authors.
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research might result from the investigative motive. More 
interestingly, however, trades in the sense of decarbonization 
trigger more follow-up trades independent of the size of the 
traded security. Therefore, our results are not driven by size 
differences of the traded stocks.
Fourth, we substitute the environmental score with the 
overall ESG score to account for other aspects of sustain-
ability. The results remain unchanged, even when including 
the social and governance dimension of sustainability. This 
mirrors the fact that the environmental score is highly cor-
related with the overall ESG score.
Last, we randomly assign stocks several times into the 
green and brown sample, respectively, regardless of their 
actual E-score. As expected, we do not find any statistically 
significant differences between decarbonization and carboni-
zation herding. This verifies that the allocation of stocks 
based on the E-score does not follow a random criterion but 
is meaningful for the representation of (de)carbonization.
Conclusion
We analyze the presence of portfolio decarbonization in the 
financial market. For this purpose, we use the most com-
prehensive institutional ownership dataset in literature and 
combine herding measures from Sias (2004) and Popescu 
and Xu (2018). In the financial market, institutional investors 
tend to follow others rather than following their own trades 
regardless whether the triggering trade is a buy or a sale. In 
addition, we find that institutional investors engage in decar-
bonization herding. This means they follow their own or 
other investors’ buy trades in green stocks and sell trades in 
brown stocks, respectively. It is noticeable that decarboniza-
tion herding is majorly triggered by following-herding, i.e., 
investors follow others in portfolio decarbonization. Across 
all investor types, decarbonization herding is greater and sig-
nificantly different from carbonization herding. In specific, 
we show that especially Investment Advisors and Hedge 
Funds promote decarbonization herding.
Overall, institutional investors seem to be prone to the 
divestment movement in the sense that they are taking part 
in it. The motives for their herding behavior are manifold. 
Decarbonization herding might be intentional as well as 
spurious. Mutual Funds and Hedge Funds might engage 
in decarbonization herding due to reputational concerns. 
Others might follow their trades, since they infer superior 
information from the behavior of the more sophisticated 
investor group. Besides, Pension Funds and Insurance 
Companies are bound to social norms which lead them to 
invest in sustainable stocks. Another circumstance leading to 
decarbonization herding are uncertain information sets about 
firms’ environmental strategies and the regulatory environ-
ment. Investors might act on the same available informa-
tion and take similar investment decisions which eventu-
ally results in herding behavior. More empirical analyses 
on these herding motives are left to future research. Fur-
thermore, the impact of decarbonization herding on stock 
prices of green and brown stocks, respectively, has yet to 
be determined.
We rather focus on an as-is description of the occurring 
phenomenon of portfolio decarbonization. In conclusion, 
for the aspired achievement of market-wide decarboniza-
tion, investors leading the herd should be encouraged to 
further decarbonize their portfolios in order to trigger fol-
low-up trades by others. Our results point to the fact that 
climate change does not only become critically important 
in the financial market, but already has arrived in asset 
management.
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Appendix
In the following, we show the derivation of the decarboniza-
tion and carbonization herding measures in a more detailed 
way. Starting from Eq. (6), where we distinguish between 
self- and following-herding resulting from buys or sales 
separately, we further split up the equation. In each quarter 
t, we differentiate whether the triggering buy or sale takes 
place in a green or a brown stock.
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where It,green and It,brown indicate the number of stocks identi-
fied as green or brown in quarter t. It is clear that the sum of 
It,green and It,brown equals the overall number of traded stocks 
It in this quarter. To calculate the portion of herding in the 
sense of decarbonization self-herding we then sum (a), fol-
lowing their own buy of a green stock, and (d), following 
their own sell of a brown stock. To calculate the portion of 
herding in the sense of carbonization self-herding, we then 
sum (b), following their own buy of a brown stock, and (c), 
following their own sale of a green stock. Likewise, decar-
bonization following-herding equals the sum of (e) and (h) 
and carbonization following-herding results from (f) plus 
(g).
References
Allen, J.W., and G.M. Phillips. 2000. Corporate Equity Ownership, 
Strategic Alliances, and Product Market Relationships. The Jour-
nal of Finance 55 (6): 2791–2815.
Bikhchandani, S., and S. Sharma. 2001. Herd Behavior in Financial 
Markets. IMF Staff Papers 47 (3): 279–310.
Boermans, M.A., and R. Galema. 2019. Are Pension Funds Actively 



































































































































































































































Bolton, P., and M. Kacperczyk, 2019. Do Investors Care About Carbon 
Risk? Working Paper. https ://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.33984 41.
Bortolotti, B., and M. Faccio. 2009. Government Control of Privatized 
Firms. The Review of Financial Studies 22 (8): 2907–2939.
Campiglio, E., Y. Dafermos, P. Monnin, J. Ryan-Collins, G. Schot-
ten, and M. Tanaka. 2018. Climate Change Challenges for Cen-
tral Banks and Financial Regulators. Nature Climate Change 8: 
462–468.
Celiker, U., J. Chowdhury, and G. Sonaer. 2015. Do Mutual Funds 
Herd in Industries? Journal of Banking & Finance 52: 1–16.
Chakravarty, S. 2001. Stealth-Trading: Which Traders’ Trades Move 
Stock Prices? Journal of Financial Economics 61 (2): 289–307.
Chava, S. 2014. Environmental Externalities and Cost of Capital. Man-
agement Science 60 (9): 2223–2247.
Choi, N., and R.W. Sias. 2009. Institutional Industry Herding. Journal 
of Financial Economics 94 (3): 469–491.
Choi, D., Z. Gao, and W. Jiang. forthcoming. Attention to Global 
Warming. The Review of Financial Studies (in press).
Crifo, P., V.D. Forget, and S. Teyssier. 2015. The Price of Environmen-
tal, Social and Governance Practice Disclosure: An Experiment 
with Professional Private Equity Investors. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 30: 168–194.
Dasgupta, A., A. Prat, and M. Verardo. 2011. The Price Impact of 
Institutional Herding. The Review of Financial Studies 24 (3): 
892–925.
Davies, S.W., and E.D. Van Wesep. 2018. The Unintended Conse-
quences of Divestment. Journal of Financial Economics 128 (3): 
558–575.
31Herds on green meadows: the decarbonization of institutional portfolios 
Dietz, S., A. Bowen, C. Dixon, and P. Gradwell. 2016. ‘Climate Value 
at Risk’ of Global Financial Assets. Nature Climate Change 6: 
676–679.
Dyck, A., K.V. Lins, L. Roth, and H.F. Wagner. 2019. Do Institutional 
Investors Drive Corporate Social Responsibility? International 
Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 131 (3): 693–714.
Eichengreen, B., D. Mathieson, B. Chadha, A. Jansen, L. Kodres, and 
S. Sharma. 1998. Hedge Funds and Financial Market Dynam-
ics. International Monetary Fund. Washington DC. Occasional 
Paper 166.
European Commission. 2018. Communication Form the Commission 
to the European Parliament, The European Council, the Coun-
cil, the European Central Bank, the European Central Bank, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions. Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth, 8 
March 2018, COM(2018) 97 Final. https ://eur-lex.europ a.eu/legal 
-conte nt/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX :52018 DC009 7&from=EN. 
Accessed 5 Sept 2019.
Graves, S.B., and S.A. Waddock. 1994. Institutional Owners and Cor-
porate Social Performance. The Academy of Management Journal 
37 (4): 1034–1046.
Grinblatt, M., S. Titman, and R. Wermers. 1995. Momentum Invest-
ment Strategies, Portfolio Performance, and Herding: A Study of 
Mutual Fund Behavior. The American Economic Review 85 (5): 
1088–1105.
Hong, H., and M. Kacperczyk. 2009. The Price of Sin: The Effects of 
Social Norms on Markets. Journal of Financial Economics 93 
(1): 15–36.
Hong, H., F.W. Li, and J. Xu. 2019. Climate Risks and Market Effi-
ciency. Journal of Econometrics 208 (1): 265–281.
Jiang, H., and M. Verardo. 2018. Does Herding Behavior Reveal Skill? 
An Analysis of Mutual Fund Performance. The Journal of Finance 
73 (5): 2229–2269.
Krueger, P., Z. Sautner, and L.T. Starks. 2019. Swiss Finance Institute 
Research Paper No. 18-58; European Corporate Governance Insti-
tute - Finance Working Paper No. 610/2019.
Lakonishok, J., A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny. 1992. The Impact of 
Institutional Trading on Stock Prices. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 32 (1): 23–43.
Litterman, R. 2015. David Swensen on the Fossil Fuel Divestment 
Debate. Financial Analysts Journal 71 (3): 11–12.
PDC. 2015. The Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition. Mobilizing 
Financial Markets to Drive Economic Decarbonization. https ://
unepfi .org/pdc/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/pdc_broch ure.pdf. Accessed 
5 Sept 2019.
PDC. 2017. Portfolio Investment in a Carbon Constrained World: The 
Third Annual Progress Report of The Portfolio Decarbonization 
Coalition. https ://unepfi .org/pdc/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/PDC-Progr 
ess-Updat e-2017.pdf. Accessed 6 Sept 2019.
Pompeo, Michael R. 2019. On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement. Press Statement. U.S. Department of State. Novem-
ber, 4. https ://www.state .gov/on-the-u-s-withd rawal -from-the-
paris -agree ment/. Accessed 05 Dec 2019.
Popescu, M., and Z. Xu. 2018. Leading the Herd: Evidence From 
Mutual Funds’ Buy and Sell Decisions. Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting 50 (4): 1131–1146.
Scharfstein, D.S., and J.C. Stein. 1990. Herd Behavior and Investment. 
The American Economic Review 80 (3): 465–479.
Sias, R.W. 2004. Institutional Herding. The Review of Financial Studies 
17 (1): 165–206.
Springer Nature. 2016. Donald Trump’s Choice for Head of the US 
Environment Agency is Dismaying. 540:315–316
Thomson Reuters. 2015. Asset4 ESG Environmental Datatypes. http://
lipas .uwasa .fi/~jaty/thoms on/ASSET 4_ESG_Conte nt_Datas tream 
_Premi um_Datat ypes.xlsx.
Trinks, A., B. Scholtens, M. Mulder, and L. Dam. 2017. Divesting Fos-
sil Fuels: The Implications for Investment Portfolios. Groningen: 
University of Groningen. SOM research school. SOM Research 
Reports.
Wermers, R. 1999. Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock 
Prices. The Journal of Finance 54 (2): 581–622.
Worley, W. 2016. Marrakesh Climate Conference: Campaigners React 
With ‘Extreme Disappointment’ Over Lack of Progress. https ://
www.indep enden t.co.uk/envir onmen t/marra kech-clima te-confe 
rence -cop-22-campa igner s-extre me-disap point ment-a7426 426.
html.
Wylie, S. 2005. Fund Manager Herding: A Test of the Accuracy of 
Empirical Results Using U.K. Data. The Journal of Business 78 
(1): 381–403.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to 
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Lukas Benz graduated in business administration from the Univer-
sity of Augsburg, Germany, in 2016. In 2016, he joined the Chair of 
Finance and Banking at the same university as a doctoral candidate. 
His research activities are focused on mutual funds and green finance.
Andrea Jacob graduated in business administration from the Univer-
sity of Augsburg, Germany, in 2016. In 2017, she joined the Chair of 
Finance and Banking at the same University as a doctoral candidate. 
Her research activities are focused on empirical asset pricing and green 
finance.
Stefan Paulus graduated in business administration from the Univer-
sity of Augsburg, Germany, in 2015. In 2015, he joined the Chair of 
Finance and Banking at the same university as a doctoral candidate. 
His research activities are focused on green finance.
Marco Wilkens graduated in business administration from the Uni-
versity of Hamburg, Germany, in 1988. Then, he joined the Chair of 
Banking and Insurance at the same university as a doctoral candidate. 
He received the doctoral degree in business administration from the 
University of Hamburg in 1993. From 1993, he was a postdoctoral 
research associate at the Chair of Banking and Finance at the Univer-
sity of Göttingen, Germany. He received his habilitation from the same 
University in 1999. From 2001 to 2010, he was Professor of Finance 
and Banking and holder of the Chair of Finance and Banking at the 
Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Germany. Since 2010, he 
has been Professor of Finance and Banking and holder of the Chair 
of Finance and Banking at the University of Augsburg, Germany. He 
has been a visiting Professor of Finance and Banking at the University 
of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, and at the Macquarie 
University, Australia, as well as at the University of Tasmania. His 
research activities are focused on mutual funds, interest rate risk, credit 
risk, carbon risk, risk management, sustainable finance, bank manage-
ment, valuation of financial instruments, and financial engineering.
